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Abstract:
This paper will address the impacts of the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT) on Morocco
and Algeria – two of North Africa’s most populous countries and the United States’ most
valuable allies in the region in terms of military strategy. The increased US political and
military activity in Algeria and Morocco since 2003 has three principle effects: it
obstructs the needed bilateral cooperation that is required for their sustained collective
security, hardens these authoritarian governments against international and domestic calls
for democratization, and inspires resentment of the US among the disenfranchised
population. Overall, this paper will argue that the American strategy used to fight
terrorism in these two countries under the banner of the GWOT has compromised
progress toward security and democracy.
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Übersicht
Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt die Auswirkungen des ‚Globalen Anti-Terror Kriegs’
(GWOT) auf zwei der bevölkerungsreichsten Länder Nordafrikas: Marokko und
Algerien. Diese Länder sind die militärstrategisch wichtigsten Partner der Vereinigten
Staaten in dieser Region. Das seit 2003 zunehmende politische und militärische
Engagement der USA in Algerien und Marokko hat in erster Linie drei Auswirkungen:
Es erschwert die bilaterale Kooperation, die als Voraussetzung für ihre gemeinsame und
dauerhafte Sicherheit gilt, es stärkt die autoritären Regierungen dieser Länder gegenüber
internationalen und nationalen Forderungen nach mehr Demokratie und schürt die
Abneigung gegenüber den USA bei der unterdrückten Bevölkerung. Zusammenfassend
wird in dieser Arbeit die These vertreten, dass die Amerikanische Strategie im Kampf
gegen den Terror unter dem Banner des GWOT eine Entwicklung in Richtung Sicherheit
und Demokratie in diesen beiden Ländern eher negativ beeinflusst hat.
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Introduction
With the twin purposes of protecting the United States against further attacks and
destabilizing terrorist networks abroad, the so-called Global War on Terror1 initially
manifested in the ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.2  The impetus for
this turn in policy came during the shockwave following the Al-Qaeda attacks on US soil
on September 11, 2001 (9/11).  By 2002, the term Global War on Terror (GWOT) had
come to stand for a paradigmatic turn in American foreign policy.  By 2003 the US had
begun low intensity counterterrorism operations in the Maghreb region such as the Pan-
Sahel Initiative (PSI), providing American military training and assistance to Algeria and
Morocco, as well as Mali, Niger and Chad.3  GWOT strategists’ classifications of the
region included an under-governed territory,4 a potential terrorist safe haven, and the next
Afghanistan.5  Many articles and reports began even to refer to the Maghreb as “the
second front in the war on terror.”6  By the time of its actual implementation in 2004, the
PSI had become the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the focus
had turned to al-Qaeda’s infiltration of national militant Islamic groups in nine North
African countries including Algeria and Morocco.7
America’s post-9/11 increase of military and political involvement in the Maghreb came
at a time when popular calls for democratization within Algeria and Morocco were
peaking and these authoritarian governments were loosing their tight grip on civil
                                                 
1 See p. 12 in the section on definitions for full discussion of the term.
2 White House, The. The United States National Security Strategy. Washington DC: September 2002
3 “Pan Sahel Initiative” Office of Counterterrorism, US Department of State. Released Nov. 7, 2002.
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/14987.htm
4 Robert G Berschinski “AFRICOM’S Dilemma: The ‘Global War on Terrorism,’ ‘Capacity Building,’
Humanitarianism, and the Future of US Security Policy in Africa.” Strategic Studies Institute of the US
Army War College. 2007. 27. See also Emily Hunt “Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A ‘Thorn in
the Neck’ of the United States?” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus #65.
February 2007. 1-4
5 David Josar “EUCOM slated to step up role in Africa.” Stars and Stripes (European Edition). Jan 11,
2004.
6 Jeremy H. Keenan "The Collapse of the Second Front." Foreign Policy In Focus. Silver City, NM and
Washington, DC: September 26, 2006. See also Berschinski, 2007 25-26.
7 John P. Entelis, “The Democratic Imperative vs. the Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State between
Transition and Terrorism.” Strategic Insights, 30:6 (June 2005). 5.
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dissidence.8  In Morocco, for example, the Sahrawi nationalist movement had come to
rely almost exclusively on non-violent protests for self-determination.9  In Algeria,
President Bouteflika (installed after the military annulled the 1991 Islamic party victory
in the country’s first elections10) began to talk seriously about compromise as the violent
civil crisis between Islamic opposition and the military regime slowed towards a halt.11
At this juncture, France maintained its economic and political support for North Africa
and especially for the Moroccan monarchy, in what had always been considered its
sphere of influence.  Meanwhile the Bush Administration launched a policy platform
centered on the Global War on Terror with its paramount objective being to encourage
democratization, liberal values and unified liberal economies.12
It seemed that the US had a momentary opportunity to engage the Maghreb in earnest
attempts to promote democratic participation, competitive elections and civil liberties.
Instead, between 2001 and 2008 the trajectory of US policy in North Africa took a
decidedly counter-productive turn.  Policy makers initially zeroed in on the barren,
minimally populated southern swath of desert that runs through Algeria and Morocco,
which they identified as conducive to Islamic terrorist organization.  However, the
increased pace and intensity of counterterrorism efforts revealed inadequate concern for
the problems of poverty and political oppression of which terrorism can often be a
symptom.13
                                                 
8 John P. Entelis, “The Democratic Imperative vs. the Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State between
Transition and Terrorism.” Strategic Insights, 30:6 (June 2005)
9 Maria J. Stephan and Jacob Mundy, “A Battlefield Transformed: From guerilla resistance to mass
nonviolent struggle in the Western Sahara.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 8: 3, (Spring 2006)
12-15
10 Martin Evans and John Phillips, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed. (London: Yale University Press,
2007) 255.
11 Jeremy H. Keenan “Security and Insecurity in North Africa,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol.
33, no. 108, (2006) 270
12 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006):1104
13 Anneli Botha “Challenges in Understanding Terrorism in Africa.” in Okumu, Wafula and Anneli Botha,
eds. Understanding Terrorism in Africa: Building Bridges and Overcoming the Gaps. Institute for Security
Studies. (Cairo, Egypt: May 2007) 10
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This paper narrows its analysis of the GWOT to Morocco and Algeria because of their
rising geostrategic profile in the eyes of the US over the last seven years.14  They are
located in the upper northwest region of the Sahel, a region of concern according to
GWOT strategists for its proximity to Iraq and for its ties with al-Qaeda that will be
discussed more in depth in chapter two. The relative size and influence of their respective
economies among the Sahelian states make them strategically desirable allies in the Arab
world.  In the policy-making process that determined these countries to be of geostrategic
importance, GWOT strategists are often too quick to make the connection between
generalized characteristics – such as widespread poverty, Muslim heritage, and vast
under governed desert areas15  – and the likelihood of harboring terrorists.16   These
sociopolitical factors, plus the problem of the Sahel’s vast unmanned borders, as well as
Morocco and Algeria’s proximity to Europe, combined to promote these countries into
the category of potential terrorist safe havens.17  Although oversimplified, this
categorization continues to structure the US response to the perceived terrorist threat
emanating from the Maghreb.
Two chief factors explain why the US perceives the northwest Maghreb to be a hotspot in
the GWOT. First, connections exist that tie certain Maghrebi militant Islamic groups to
the those operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, such as the fact that many extremists in
Morocco and Algeria who have taken up arms (mainly against their own governments)
were in fact trained in the Soviet-Afghan War.18  Secondly, the expansive Saharan desert
– roughly the size of the continental United States – cuts across borders from the horn of
Africa to the Moroccan coast making border traffic difficult to patrol.  Because a key
aspect of the US global counterterrorism strategy is to control and monitor the
international movement of money, goods, and terrorist suspects, the prospect of a trans-
                                                 
14 Robert G Berschinski “AFRICOM’S Dilemma: The ‘Global War on Terrorism,’ ‘Capacity Building,’
Humanitarianism, and the Future of US Security Policy in Africa.” Strategic Studies Institute of the US
Army War College. (2007) 3
15 Emily Hunt “Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A ‘Thorn in the Neck’ of the United States?”
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus #65. 2007. 12.
16 “Algeria” The World Factbook. US Central Intelligence Agency. 2008.
17 Berschinski (2007)
18 Mathieu Guidère, Al Qaïda à la conquête du Maghreb: le terrorisme aux portes de l’Europe. Monaco :
Éditions du Rocher, 2007. 59-60.
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continental conduit is especially disconcerting to policy makers and military strategists.19
The concerns outlined by these two factors are summed up in the “Banana Theory of
Terrorism”20 named for the curved swath of under-policed borders between hot zones of
confrontation (Afghanistan and Iraq) westward through the middle-east and along the
coastal Mediterranean countries.  Chapter three will explain how this threat assessment,
although plausible, is highly unrealistic.
The international academic and political debate over America’s foreign policy objectives
embodied by the GWOT – their success, their shortcomings, and their justification – is
contentious and multisided.  This paper will examine the spectrum of GWOT analyses
regarding specifically Algeria and Morocco, arguing that the intensification of US
military presence there since the 9/11 attacks has missed its mark, failing to improve
American security and leaving northwest Africans less secure.  The post-9/11 US foreign
policy, still encapsulated by the seven-year-old Global War on Terror paradigm, aims to
encourage democracy and liberal freedoms while fighting terrorism.21  Problems arise,
however, when the means used to combat terrorism contribute to the restriction of civil
liberties abroad.22
From Washington’s point of view, bolstering the stability of these two leading moderate
Islamic countries through counterterrorism partnership programs would build valuable
allies in the Muslim world.23 The resulting influx of US support has further entrenched
the authoritarian principles of government in Rabat and Algiers and reinforced the
security establishment’s staunch oppression of dissident voices and insurgent elements,
                                                 
19 Emily Hunt “Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa: A ‘Thorn in the Neck’ of the United States?”
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus #65. 2007. vii
20 For more on the Banana Theory of Terrorism see chapter 3, see also Jeremy H.  Keenan “The Banana
Theory of Terrorism: Alternative Truths and the Collapse of the ‘Second’ (Saharan) Front in the War on
Terror.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 25, 1. January 2007
21 White House, The. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC.
March 2006.
22 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006): 1003
23 Yahia H. Zoubir, and Karima Benabdallah-Gambier. “The United States and the North African
Imbroglio: Balancing Interests in Algeria, Morocco, and the Western Sahara” Mediterranean Politics, 10, 2
(2005) 182-3
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setting back the cause of democratization in the region several years.24  Moreover, this
intervention to promote cooperation with the US has removed the incentive for regional
cooperation, further distancing two countries whose governments are already at odds.
This paper’s argument will consist of three major points: (1) The long-term security of
these two Maghrebi adversaries depends upon their cooperation towards democratization,
liberalization and counterterrorism. (2) US involvement is injecting enough military
strength and international political clout into each state to sustain their oppression of civil
calls for democratization. (3) The sustained build-up of US forces in the region in hopes
of eradicating al-Qaeda strongholds has instead promoted stronger anti-American
aggression.25  This paper will show how the US military’s strong-arm approach towards
imposing this liberal democratic design undermines its attainment and thwarts the success
of counterterrorism by bolstering authoritarian governments and fostering a resentment of
the US.
                                                 
24 Jeremy H. Keenan, “Security and Insecurity in North Africa,” Review of African Political Economy, 33:
108 (2006) j279
25 Paul Rogers. Global Security and the War on Terror: Elite power and the illusion of control. London and
New York: Routledge, 2008. 166; see also Berschinki, (2007), 43; Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire:
Western footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East. New York: Beacon Press, 2004; Barry
Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6. (2006): 1102-
3.
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Methodology and Review of Literature
This section will recount how I arrived at this topic and the academic approach used to
investigate it.  My interest in the region began three years ago when I focused my
undergraduate degree in Global Studies on decolonization in the French Maghreb,
specifically Algeria and Morocco.  As I continued this emphasis into my master’s degree
in Global Studies, several global political and social currents had started to converge over
the Maghreb and cemented my interest in the region.  Tacitly recognizing France’s zone
of influence, the US traditionally has treated the Maghreb with indifference, but as
France continued to distance itself from the GWOT, and from the 2003 invasion of Iraq
in particular, Washington policy makers increasingly saw the need to reinstate US
presence across the Mediterranean from its European allies.26  As Martins and Phillips
argue, this approach began with the same assumption that US counter-terrorist chiefs
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the Department of Defense (DoD) have
often used: that counterterrorism in this region is “too important strategically to be left to
France.”27
These conditions piqued my interest in the topic, and so I began the research process.
This paper’s extensive research began broadly as a literary review on the topic of
changing security and geopolitics in the Maghreb since the region became an area of
concern for the United States in its post 9/11 Global War on Terror.  I arrived at a topic
about which relatively little is written.  To begin, I read several articles from social
anthropologist Jeremy Keenan, whose current topic of focus is security and
counterterrorism in the Maghreb.  His research was primarily based on first-hand
observation in the region, but his inclusion of other literature led me to political scientists
John Entelis, Barry Buzan, Mustafa Barth, and Yahia Zoubir.  Their sharp critique of
what is sometimes referred to in this category of literature as the US’s ‘Second Front’ in
                                                 
26 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006): 1113
27 Martin Evans and John Phillips, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed. (London : Yale University Press,
2007) 254-5
Mayock
14
the GWOT28 seemed to be only half of the academic debate over US involvement in
North Africa.  It was then that several successive searches of Internet databases
uncovered articles from more conservative points of view, usually ones written by
military mouthpieces or by universities and think tanks associated with the Pentagon.
Subsequent articles by Robert Berschinski, Emily Hunt and Jacob Mundy helped to
round out the discussion.
Next, my research turned to books published on the topic of the GWOT’s impact on
North Africa, of which there are few.  The relative paucity of books I attribute to three
factors.  First, the newness of the GWOT as a policy directive meant that at the time I
began my research, only six years had passed since its inception.  Although broad
critiques of the GWOT were coming in vogue at the time, there was only a relatively
small body of reliable books by academic experts.  Second, while books on the GWOT
were scarce, books treating its intersection with Algeria and Morocco specifically
represented a fraction of that already small category.  Finally, operating out of the
University of Vienna (UV), Austria made finding relevant books in English slightly more
difficult, initially.  Although the library’s collection was expansive, it was not until spring
of 2008 that the UV Library of Cultural and Socio Anthropology received Paul Rogers’s
2008 collection of articles on Global Security and the War on Terror, and then the UV
Library of Contemporary History was able to order two books on my behalf; one by
Andrew Martin and Patrice Petro, the other by Matheu Guidère,
Finally, to support the timeline of events and to track the changes in rhetoric or thinking
on the part of the US, it was critical to consult official statements, press releases and
reports from the White House.  In the same vein, speeches made by the president, talks
by administration mouthpieces, and journalistic articles were also useful in order to show
the changing perception in Washington of the threat in North Africa and its portrayal in
the media.
                                                 
28 Mustafa Barth “Sand Castles in the Sahara: US Military Basing in Algeria.” Review of African Political
Economy, 30:98 (December 1, 2003) 679; J.H. Keenan, “The Banana Theory of Terrorism: Alternative
Truths and the Collapse of the ‘Second’ (Saharan) Front in the War on Terror.” Journal of Contemporary
African Studies. 25, 1 (2007): 31
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Finally the driving question of my thesis started to take shape: What impact or impacts
has the US Global War on Terror had on Moroccan and Algerian security and
geopolitics? This paper will attempt to answer this question in three sections.  The first
chapter is a historical and political analysis of these two Maghrebi states and the
historical and contemporary political relationship between them and each with the United
States, respectively.  Then, the terrorist threat in North Africa will be analyzed from both
an empirical, or material standpoint, and also from the “securitization” 29 perspective as
outlined by political scientist Barry Buzan.30  Before the final conclusions the third
chapter will discuss the US actions taken militarily and politically in Morocco and
Algeria from 2003 up until Spring 2008.
                                                 
29 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006): 1101-1118.
30 see page 18, “Security versus Securitization,” in the Definitions chapter for greater discussion on this
topic
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Definitions
This paper will describe the intersection of two contemporary currents in international
affairs: United States foreign policy since 2001, referred to here as the “Global War on
Terror”, and regional security in Morocco and Algeria.  These two topics will also
provide this paper’s temporal and spatial limitations.  The topics and concepts described
in this section are contentious and likely to incur criticism, but a workable understanding
must be established in order to come to any meaningful analysis of how America’s
military presence in Morocco and Algeria is impacting regional security.
The Global War on Terror
Authors who have analyzed the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT) use different labels for
this turn in policy, from the “New Imperialism”31 to “the new Cold War.”32 The White
House calls it “the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century.”33  Due to the
repeated use of this title in political speeches, government policy reports, and
contemporary media, the phrase has become commonplace as a reference to the broad
range of American counter-terrorism measures since 9/11.  This paper will accept the
validity of GWOT as appropriate terminology to refer to the banner under which US
foreign policy has operated since 2001, but not without critically evaluating its
conception.  It is especially important to look at the recent argument of political scientist
Barry Buzan, which holds that the GWOT is fast becoming a defining international
security paradigm similar to what the Cold War framework was up until the early
nineties.34  The terminology in use, however, is already evolving.  The architects of the
Bush administration, as of 2007, began to reframe the Global War on Terror as the ‘long
                                                 
31 Jeremy H. Keenan, Waging war on Terror: The Implications of America’s ‘New Imperialism’ for
Saharan Peoples.” The journal of North African Studies. 10: 3-4. (2005). 619
32 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006): 1101
33 The White House, President George W. Bush. “Fact Sheet: The Sixth Anniversary of 9/11…” Office of
the Press Secretary. Sept.11, 2007.
34 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006): 1101.
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war’35 – an enduring struggle of ideologies that they hope will transcend the negativities
associated with some of its unsuccessful initiatives such as the invasion of Iraq.36
Without stepping outside the temporal scope of this paper’s topic, a brief retrospective
into the makings of today’s US foreign policy stance is needed.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, America’s foreign relations strategy was built
around the ability to militarily and politically contain the Soviet Union until its demise in
1989.  Shortly after the crumbling of the USSR, policy makers looked towards
delineating a new position for the US in world affairs.37  Security studies expert Barry
Buzan argues that this point in US policy-making is characterized by a “threat deficit,”
wherein Washington was lacking a hegemonic concept of global security that would cast
the US in a leadership role. 38  In the 1990s, many of those in Republican circles
perceived President Clinton’s preference for diplomacy as an inability to arm the US in
defense of its security interests overseas.39  This neoconservative viewpoint has always
held the US to be a civilizing force, charged with a duty to shape international affairs;
this opinion was manifest in the policy of the George W. Bush administration.40  When
the September 11th attacks took place, only nine months into the Bush presidency, Buzan
argues that Washington conservatives were provided with the fodder to build a case for a
powerful emerging global ideological struggle led by the US, which from then on was
dubbed the “Global War on Terror.”
                                                 
35 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006): 1101; Ian Lustick et al. “Symposium: Are We Trapped in the War on Terror?” transcript published
by Middle East Policy Council. Washington, D.C. November 3, 2006.
36 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006):1109
37 Paul Rogers, Global Security and the War on Terror: Elite power and the illusion of control. (London
and New York: Routledge, 2008) 107-8
38 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006): 1101
39 Rogers (2008) 156-7
40 Rogers (2008) 159
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Buzan is not the only political observer to compare the GWOT and the Cold War.41  This
association derives from the Bush administration’s deliberate repetition of symbolic
parallels between the struggle to contain communism and the global war on terror.  For
instance it was common in both eras to frame US interests as synonymous to Global
interests, in order to rally allies to the cause.42  The 2006 US National Security Strategy
focuses on two key operative precepts: first, that in order to prevent attacks on US soil it
is necessity to engage the enemy abroad; and second, that success in this war against
terrorist extremists depends on the strength of “transformational diplomacy,” or
Washington’s ability to ideologically shape other nations in a liberal democratic image.43
The GWOT is primarily a political posturing that justifies and gives unity to the myriad
US foreign policy objectives worldwide.  Although it is a fairly robust security
framework on the same scope and scale as the Cold War, in the end the GWOT is not as
stable a construct for United States security.  Buzan cites two characteristics of the
framework and its resultant policies that diminish its endurance.  First, the weak process
used to justify action taken under the GWOT banner will not hold up over time.  Chapter
three of this paper, on the thinking behind US involvement in Algeria and Morocco, will
talk more about the treatment of evidence justifying action, namely the systematic
amalgamation of disparate threats, upon which counterterrorist activities in North Africa
are based.44  The second major weakness of the GWOT – which is closely related to the
main argument of this paper – is that the tactics used in the pursuit of Islamic terrorists
actually threaten the values they purportedly protect.45
                                                 
41 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006): 1101; Lustick, Ian, Ivan Eland, Rand Beers, Edward Luttwak. “Symposium: Are We Trapped in the
War on Terror?” transcript published by Middle East Policy Council. Washington, D.C. November 3, 2006.
42 Buzan (2006) 1108
43 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America Washington D.C.
2006. 43-4
44 David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency.” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4. Aug.
2005, 597-617. 608. see page 41.
45 Barry Buzan, “Will the ‘global war terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” International Affairs, 82: 6.
(2006): 1103
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The Maghreb
This paper, although dedicated to Algeria and Morocco specifically, will refer at times to
the surrounding region.  These two countries have the two highest gross domestic
products and are the most populous of the region.46 Emily Hunt, writing for the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, calls Morocco and Algeria “the epicenter of
terrorist activity in northwestern Africa.”47  Often the meaning of geographic or geo-
political regional labels are taken for granted, so this section will briefly explain the
various regional headings under which Morocco and Algeria fall.
The Maghreb is an easily delineated region consisting (in most definitions) of five states:
Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.48  Geographically distinguished from
neighboring regions such as Europe or central Africa, it also shares a relatively high
cultural, linguistic, historical and political cohesion.49  The name “Maghreb,” Arabic for
“western,” came about in the 7th century when the Umayyad Caliphate seated in
Damascus extended its empire westward.50  In the 15th century the region came under
Ottoman rule, but control was minimal except for administrative contact between
Constantinople and the major capitols such as Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.51  In the
colonial era, France exerted the most influence on the region, although Spain and Italy
also had influence over Morocco and Libya, respectively.
The Maghreb is also referred to under other broader titles, for instance the acronym
MENA, for Middle East and North Africa, is popular shorthand among certain
international bodies such as the World Bank, but it has a vague definition including
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between twelve and fifteen states from Morocco to Iran.52  The US Military prefers using
“the Sahel” – a more geographic grouping that includes a fairly straight-forward list of
countries bordering the Sahara Desert: Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Morocco, Algeria,
Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, Libya, Chad and the Western Sahara territory. When addressing
the specific strategic concerns relating to the shared problem of difficult-to-patrol desert
borders, the Sahel categorization is useful.
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Security versus Securitization
This paper poses the question: What are the impacts on Algerian and Moroccan security
caused by the GWOT?  In constructing a relevant answer to the nature and effects of US
security strategy, it is important to define the broader concept of security. This section
outlines the components of security that will come to bear on this paper’s argument,
specifically the idea that Morocco and Algeria’s security – that of their people and of
their region – is not best served by the US Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) nor by other operations under the GWOT mandate.
Keenan writes that security analysis “revolves around two critical questions; namely,
whose security and security from whom or what?”53  The traditional realist approach is
concerned mainly with the security of the Westphalian model of the state against external
military threats.54 Today multiple applications of the concept of security exist in academic
literature from political science, international relations, and the still-emerging discipline
of security studies.  Keenan asserts that on the individual, state and international level,
overall security in North Africa at the end of the 1990s was improving.  His argument
takes into account factors such as the level of violence, the extent of democratic opening,
and progress toward peace in territorial disputes (such as that over the Western Sahara).55
In his argument, it is a direct result of America’s post 9/11 involvement in North Africa
that the previously mentioned indicators – ending violence, democratization, and
cooperation on territorial disputes – are declining once again.56  Rather than increasing
security in the North African region, US support for the regimes (especially through US
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corporations’ investment in the hydrocarbon sector) the US has instead strengthened the
authoritarian security establishments of Morocco and Algeria.57
Keenan goes on to explain in specifics how, in the name of cooperation under the
GWOT, not only Morocco and Algeria but every regime in the Maghreb has instituted
political repression by labeling dissidents as terrorists or linking them somehow to
terrorist groups.58  For example, in 2003 Moroccan parliament passed a tough new anti-
terrorism law after the Casablanca bombings that same year killed forty-three people in
five coordinated blasts.59  This legislation is sometimes cited by US policymakers as
evidence that the counterterrorism efforts coordinated under the GWOT are moving in
the right direction,60 but in reality it has done more to imprison the innocent than to
thwart terrorists.  While attacks from Islamic radicals like the 2003 Casablanca bombings
no doubt deserve a harsh reaction from the government, the legislation passed has
provided merely a justification for authoritarian abuses of human rights, including
arbitrary arrest, torture, and unfair trials.61
Despite the arguments of Keenan and others that the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership is in fact decreasing the level of security in North Africa on multiple levels,
the United States National Security Strategy of 2006 still holds that the aid packages and
military assistance being invested in Morocco and Algeria is making America more
secure – joining with allies abroad in an effort to “keep [the enemy] on the run”  and
prevent them from coming to US soil.62  It is difficult to argue that the joint military
operations held in the Sahel or the diplomatic pressure to pass counterterrorism
legislation are positively impacting the security of American individuals.  However,
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analyzing these actions from the perspective of US security on the level of the Nation-
state, they do benefit the US government by reinforcing the GWOT framework.  This
accomplishment, according to Barry Buzan, stabilizes American hegemony on the global
level.63  Strides taken in counterterrorism initiatives abroad, such as the 2004 Moroccan
anti-terrorist legislation, help to frame US interests as universal principles.64
Buzan’s article on security and the GWOT starts with the premise that nothing changed
in international security after 9/11 except for the perception that something had
changed,65 and this perception was used in Washington to redefine US foreign policy
interests.  Security is therefore closely tied to beliefs and perceptions of security, or
securitization.66 According to Buzan the analysis of a ‘securitization’ – as opposed to a
materialist analysis of security – hinges on whether something can be successfully
constructed as a threat, with this understanding being accepted by a wide and/or
specifically relevant audience.”67  In the case of Morocco and Algeria, the under-policed
desert expanses to the south were successfully constructed as threatening once viewed
through the GWOT.
It could be argued that the success of the GWOT as a securitization creates a paradigm
that places the US in a leadership role in international politics and is therefore beneficial
to US security.  States like Morocco and Algeria, by playing into the GWOT
securitization are in turn able to tap into the financial resources provided by a partnership
with the US, thereby boosting their national security. For example Algeria is suspected of
manipulating the terrorist threat, even helping to stage terrorist attacks,68 in order to
justify the repeated renewal of the state of emergency under which the military regime
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justifies its control.69  As countries like Algeria and Morocco vie for US funding, the
presence of a certain level of terrorist violence begins to work in their favor.  Thus it
becomes clear that the GWOT is experiencing negative feedback counterproductive to its
goal of bettering American security.
In summary, after the attacks of 9/11 the GWOT was presented initially as a strategic
directive – a new task to which the United States would devote its unmatched military
power.  Upon further analysis, however, the concept is more of a securitization paradigm,
under which a myriad of aggressive and often unilateral American actions are justified.
Built into the US security strategy, which today is centered on the GWOT, is a policy of
rewarding countries like Morocco and Algeria who cooperate with the US in
counterterrorism.  One of the greatest flaws of this system is that these authoritarian
governments, eager to gain trade privileges and diplomatic clout through association with
the US, and in pursuit of financial aid to their security establishment, tend to exaggerate
the terrorist threat they face.  The material security of the United States is left unchanged
if not worsened, and the people of Morocco and Algeria face an increased threat to their
day-to-day security from their own government.
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Chapter 1: Algeria and Morocco
Background
Historically, Algeria and Morocco share many traits common to the region resulting from
the influence of neighboring cultures: ancient Islamic civilizations to the East, colonial
Europe to the north, and less significantly, mercantile West Africa.70  Not until the
sixteenth century did the separate territories that would become the modern states of
Morocco and Algeria begin to take shape,71 and that is where their broad similarities give
way to their differences.  Most prominent are their different political structures.  In the
wake of Ottoman rule, Algeria adopted the patrimonial military state structure, in which
state power remained in the hands of a small elite that presided mainly over the coastal
areas, with tribal leaders of the interior left to govern themselves.72  Morocco instead
developed along the Arab caliphate model, ruled by shurafa, (singular sharif, meaning
descendent) whose legitimacy depends on a lineage traced back to the Prophet
Mohammed.73 Although different in their structure, the governing apparatus in both
countries reinforce the patrimonial logic upon which several Maghrebi authoritarian
governments operate.74
This early divergence in political structures persists today, despite a destructive period of
European intervention in the colonial era, a topic explored further in chapter two. Since
1962 the generals and soldiers of the military extension of the Algerian nationalist party
(FLN) have run the country, using the military to silence opposition.  Morocco adopted a
constitutional monarchy in 1957 as a condition of independence from France, but
functions on a closed system of nepotism.  Although it is outside the main temporal focus
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of this paper, this history is important in discussing the relationship between the US and
its two key Maghrebi allies today.
Algeria’s military regime and Morocco’s constitutional monarchy have tried in the past to
cooperate on security, economic development and other regional issues, but their thirty-
year political stand-off over the Western Sahara territory prevents any unified action.
Algeria is the biggest state supporter of the group fighting Morocco for self-
determination, the Polisario Front.  The following section will focus on the regional and
historic importance of this territorial dispute, outlining Algeria and Morocco’s history of
mutual animosity over the Western Sahara dispute.  A resolution to this issue is the
lynchpin on which further regional cooperation relies.  The final section provides greater
detail of the contemporary nature of US relations with Morocco and Algeria,
respectively, and the ways in which the GWOT has impacted these relations.
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The Western Sahara Conflict
In 1970 Morocco was at the center of a geopolitical situation that was about to undergo
significant changes.  Spain owned the land south of Morocco, known then as the Spanish
Sahara.  It was one of the last colonial territories in Africa, and while general Franco’s
health deteriorated King Hassan II of Morocco plotted to take over the territory in the
wake of Spanish rule.  Meanwhile, a group of Sahrawi students from the Mohammed V
University in Rabat began a movement to resist colonial rule. In May 1973 the group
formally named themselves The Polisario Front75 and they made broad appeals to the
Maghrebi nations for support to achieve a definitive end to Spanish colonial control.76
After receiving backing from Colonel Qadhafi, they began their guerilla campaign,
comprised initially of attacks on Spanish garrisons and desert outposts, and later on
Moroccan military targets.77 The front solidified their objective to pursue “national
liberation… and the achievement of complete independence.”78  Polisario had defined
itself as the voice of all Sahrawi people, as well as part of a larger Arab movement.79 This
movement would prove to be an enduring resistance group and key political actor in the
contemporary conflict.80
In October 1975, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), ruled in affirmation of the
Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination, but Hassan II elected to ignore that finding
– the ruling’s main point – and acknowledged only the section that affirmed Morocco’s
stake in the territory.81  The King never recognized the issue as one of decolonization, so
to reclaim the region, he organized the relocation of 350,000 Moroccan volunteers –
soldiers and settlers – in a project he referred to as the “Green March,” for the holy color
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of Islam.82  Algeria saw this move as merely the latest manifestation of Morocco’s desire
for territorial expansion and began to support the Polisario’s calls for self-
determination.83 Spain illegally signed the territory over to Morocco and Mauritania on
February 26, 1976.  Morocco immediately occupied the majority (roughly sixty per cent)
of the area Spain vacated, while Mauritania seized fifteen per cent.84  Accounts from
Sahrawi residents who remember the time of Spanish withdrawal and the Green March
recount how surprising it was, as people had previously felt such little connection to
Rabat.85
Spain never provided for a referendum on self-determination in its former colony, as the
United Nations General Assembly mandated in repeat resolutions spanning 1964 to
1973.86  Spain was sure to sign trade agreements, however, with Morocco and Mauritania
to ensure Spanish ships could maintain fishing enterprises in the rich waters off the
Western Saharan coast.87   In 1978 Mokhtar Ould Daddah, Mauritania’s president, fell to
a military coup spurred on largely by the humiliation of military defeat at the hands of the
Poliario.88  Politically Mauritania would continue to support Morroco’s annexation, but
this coup effectively ended Mauritania’s territorial interest in the region.  The Moroccan
king feared the same fate as Daddah if his military bowed to the Polisario Front’s forces,
or if he was to hold a referendum that did not affirm his assertions that the territory was
in fact a southern province of Morocco, held captive by a few wayward secessionist
Moroccans.  By the end of the 1970’s, with the legitimacy of the crown then wrapped up
in its assertion of sovereignty in the Western Sahara, full independence became an
unacceptable solution in the eyes of the king.  This bolstered the monarch’s resolve, and
prevented him from even acknowledging Polisario’s existence by agreeing to talks.
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As is typical in territorial disputes, the parties’ mutually exclusive definitions of the
situation have rendered arbitration and peace talks extremely difficult.89  Morocco’s
assertion that the conflict is a civil uprising, and not a territorial dispute, is so narrowly
conceived as to seem disingenuous, and at times mocking.  For instance, when in 2001
Polisario’s president Mohammed Abdelaziz sent King Mohammed VI an invitation to
arrange for negotiations, Mohammed’s only reply was that Abdelaziz was welcome to
come to Rabat as a subject to pay homage to the king.90  A review of Morocco’s
consistent stance since the 1970s reveals that Rabat’s goal is to outlast the opposition, or
in other words, to wait to gain sovereignty by international recognition after the United
Nations and other arbitrators have exhausted their patience, funding, and goodwill.
Algeria’s backing has been the most important for Polisario since 1976 when Algeria
opened its borders to Sahrawi refugees and committed military support to the cause.
Emerging from a decade-long civil war, twenty-first century Algeria is engaging more in
regional foreign policy than the Algeria of the 1970s and 80s.91  There have been attempts
from several Maghrebi governments to call for political and economic unification, and in
1995 Algeria was spearheading the integration process when Morocco suspended its
participation in the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) over Algeria’s pro-Sahrawi stance.92
Then, just before the UMA summit in 1999, King Hassan II signaled a real readiness to
improve communication and engage in talks with Algeria’s Bouteflika, but Hassan
passed away suddenly on the 24th of July before the meeting could take place.93 The
following year, heads of state from Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia held a brief
summit to begin the resuscitation of the UMA, signaling their acceptance of the fact that
participation in the global economy was becoming increasingly difficult alone.94  They
scheduled a UMA summit for 2002 but Mohammed backed out at the last minute.
                                                 
89 Steven R. Ratner, “Land Feuds and Their Solutions: Finding International Law beyond the Tribunal
Chamber” The American Journal of International Law, 100: 4. (Oct. 2006) 811
90 “Polisario’s Sinking Hopes: Promises, promises, never kept.” The Economist. 361: 8251. (Dec. 8, 2001)1
91 Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Resurgence of Algeria’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century.” The
Journal of North African Studies. 9, 2 (2004) 169
92 Zoubir (2004) 171
93 Zoubir (2004) 171
94 Zoubir (2004) 172
Mayock
30
Although Algeria and Morocco both express a desire for greater cooperation, the issue of
the Western Sahara continues to poison the chances for any real unified action.
Morocco’s ongoing boycott of the African Union, (called the Organization for African
Unity prior to 2002) illustrates how the conflict is preventing closer regional economic
cooperation.  Despite Moroco’s integral role in the union’s creation, in 1984 the
country’s delegates walked out of the OAU in reaction to several member countries’
recognition of the SADR as a member state.95  This action contributed to stalling the
Western Saharan peace process, increasing King Hassan’s international diplomatic
isolation and awarding a major diplomatic advantage to Algeria and the Polisario Front.96
Political victories like these have increased Polisario’s political leverage in the conflict
despite its relative military weakness in comparison to Morocco.
Although Algeria has been the most influential supporter of the Sahrawi people and the
Polisario front, the most influential arbitrator was Former US Secretary of State James
Baker.97  In 1997, shortly after he assumed the post of UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan
appointed Baker as special representative to the Western Sahara.98  Baker mediated
between the Polisario Front and Morocco and by 1999 delivered a plan for self-
determination and a list of eligible voters for a referendum, but Morocco ducked the
referendum process, demonstrating once more the fundamental and multiple
disagreements between the parties.  It was then that Annan and Baker both began to
seriously favor an alternative to the referendum solution, in what many critics have called
an acceptance of Morocco’s open and repeated infringement upon international legality.99
In a final attempt to uphold the initial ICJ ruling for a referendum, Baker submitted the
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“Baker Plan II” in early 2003.  Despite reservations, the Algerians and Sahrawis suddenly
accepted the proposal in order to force Moroccan refusal and reveal the bad faith
intentions of the opposing party.100  Baker Plan II called for the UN Security Council to
enforce the plan’s implementation (a caveat that the Moroccans and the French staunchly
opposed). Baker’s frustrated resignation in 2004 marks the end of the US’s most
significant involvement in this dispute between Morocco and the Algerian-backed
Polisario.  Stalemate set in once again as US attention turned to Iraq and Al-Qaeda’s
global jihadist movement, and Rabat’s illegal presence in the Western Sahara was
thereby implicitly supported by the US.101
This crumbling of the second Baker plan was in no small part due to France’s enduring
protection of Morocco’s interests in the UN Security Council (UNSC).  This paper’s
focus is on US influence but it would be a mistake not to acknowledge the influential role
of France in its former colonies.  France can be counted on to block any UN resolution
that would forcibly implement a Western Sahara solution that does not align with Rabat
and Paris’ view that Morocco’s sovereignty must remain intact.102  With the Moroccan
kingdom as one of its major trading partners, Paris has used its UNSC veto more than
once to thwart resolutions advocating for the Sahrawi’s right to self-determination.103
France is careful not to allow its special relationship with Morocco to interfere with its
delicate and complex relationship with Algeria.104 French-Algerian relations did not
become friendly until the early 2000s but Algeria in the twenty-first century has become
a force for cooperation on economic policy and security in the Mediterranean.105  Despite
this increased regional clout, Algiers is still unable to negotiate European support for the
long avoided referendum for the Sahrawi people.
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One reason why Algeria and the Polisario have been unable to convince the international
arena to act decisively relates to the mineral resources to be found in the Western Sahara.
While international law unwaveringly upholds the right of all people to self-
determination, especially in the wake of colonial rule such as Spain’s, international
business is far less strict.  Extraction companies interested in phosphate (the region’s
primary export) or oil prospects have repeatedly confirmed Morocco’s three-decade de
facto ownership of the Western Sahara territory.  In 2001 two oil companies - one based
in Paris and the other in Houston – signed oil-prospecting contracts off of the West
Saharan coast.  These contracts were signed with the Moroccan government and
completely ignored the SADR’s authority,106 demonstrating that the stalemate over the
territory is not only due to Moroccan stubbornness but also international complicity.
The SADR has become less of a state in waiting, and more of a state in neglect, and this
status may have been unintentionally compounded by the UN intervention that would
have upheld the rights of the Sahrawi people.  Eric Jensen, leader from 1994 to 1998 of
MINURSO (the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara,) 107
and other analysts point out that while the UN-brokered ceasefire has saved lives, it
conversely provided a semblance of resolution and allowed the low-intensity conflict
over the Western Sahara to fade in importance from the international perspective.108
Moreover, for the parties directly involved in the fighting it “removed the incentive to
compromise that arises when fighting leads to exhaustion and grows too costly, so that an
alternative becomes appealing.”109  Violence is a recourse to be avoided in any conflict
and this paper does not intend to advocate it, however the status of “neither peace nor
war”110 that has replaced the fighting in the Western Sahara is no solution at all.111
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Although the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces were able to neutralize the Polisario in the
initial fifteen-year armed struggle, there has been no decisive Moroccan victory to justify
Morocco’s territorial claims.  Furthermore, no foreign nation or international body has
ever formally diplomatically recognized Morocco’s sovereignty despite the more than
three-decade-long military occupation.112  Rabat’s appeal to western powers, who see the
monarchy as a moderate Islamic government in an unstable region, has prevented the
application of any meaningful pressure towards holding a referendum, the outcome of
which might destabilize a valuable Arab partner to France and the US.  International
acquiescence to Morocco’s claims would be perceived in Algeria as encouragement of
Moroccan irredentism, and would exacerbate the existing mutual aggression that prevents
regional integration.113  Today an entire generation of the Sahrawi people has grown up in
refugee camps.  Without a resolution to the Western Sahara dispute Morocco and Algeria
will remain adversaries and not allies, and the Sahrawi people swill continue to be the
ones who suffer.
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American Relations
Moroccan-American relations go back to the 18th century when the Kingdom of Morocco
became one of the first nations to recognize the United States’ independence from Great
Britain.114  With the exception of Egypt, more US aid has gone to Morocco since its 1956
independence than to any other Arab country.115 US policy toward Morocco, from
decolonization up until 9/11, is characterized mainly by ambivalence, if not apathy.
However the desire to retain Morocco as a valuable ally in the Arab world has often
necessitated backing their position against the SADR in the Western Saharan dispute – a
subjugation of America’s principl ed support of self-determination.116  In 1980 the US
decided to back Morocco in the desert war against the Polisario Front with arms sales.117
In 1991 the parties of the dispute agreed to a ceasefire, and the US diverted its attention
to the violent civil war in Algeria, which erupted at around the same time.118  Partly
because of the bloodshed in Algeria – bloodshed perpetrated by extreme Islamicists and
returned by the oppressive authoritarian establishment – Morocco earned points for
seeming more moderate and stable in comparison to its tumultuous neighbor.
After 9/11 when the GWOT became the US’s dominant policy directive, Morocco’s
standing with the US increased again as the US sought to draw closer ties of cooperation
to help Rabat deal with rising jihadism in the country.119 In 2004 the US rewarded
Morocco’s counterterrorist efforts and cooperation in the GWOT by opening a Free
Trade Agreement.120  In April 2007 Morocco proposed a plan to give the Western Sahara
“meaningful autonomy” under Moroccan sovereignty, and the US supported it fully even
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though it had no mention of a referendum.121 This endorsement, however, contradicts the
position of the US that any solution to the disputed Western Sahara territory must be
“consistent with [the Sahrawis] right of Self-determination.”122 This contradiction in US
policy toward Morocco is representative of the complex long-standing diplomatic
relations between the two countries.  The prioritization of counterterrorism in the US
relationship with Morocco has allowed goals like democratization and transparency to
loose importance.  This is the defining paradox in US-Moroccan relations and it is
compounding the problem of anti-Americanism among disenfranchised Moroccans.
Algerian-American relations are relatively newer.  The US was apathetic to opening
relations with post-colonial Algeria.  Algeria did not take a side in the cold war; in fact
Algeria was a champion of the non-aligned movement until the fall of the Soviet
Union.123  The Algerian government cancelled national elections in 1992 for fear of the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party taking control of the parliament.124  Bloody civil war
broke out in which a diverse range of Islamic extremist groups attacked police officers,
officials working for the government (which they considered religiously bankrupt and
financially corrupt) as well as civilians deemed too loyal to the government.125  The
violence lasted for several years, and the government massacred scores of innocent
citizens, often blaming renegade extremist groups.  The US and other western nations
turned a blind eye for the most part.  It was not until the late 1990s that the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) opened an office in Algiers as Washington recognized the
threat to American security posed by Algerian-based terrorist groups.126  President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika negotiated a cease-fire in 1999, and that same year the US reopened
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talks to expand military cooperation with Algeria by planning several diplomatic visits
and joint counterterrorism maneuvers.127
As of today, Algeria is one of the biggest US trading partners in the Arab world128 and is
considered by Washington to be a pivotal state in terms of maintaining regional stability
– a key to securing US interests and oil imports.129  A member of Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the country derives much of its funds from the
hydrocarbon sector.130  Although the US has historically remained uninvolved with
Algerian domestic affairs, Washington’s position has always been one of encouragement,
touting concern for democratization, better governance, and the expansion of civil
society.131 In 2002 the US committed to a doubling in investment in the International
Military Education and Training Program, to bolster the Algerian military’s ability to
combat terrorists, a minimal contribution.  Some of the militant Islamic groups who
fought in the civil war reorganized under the name of the Salafist Group for Teaching and
Combat (GSPC).  For financial and networking assistance, the GSPC appealed to al-
Qaeda, and as they continued to target government agents and symbols, foreigners, and
civilians, the US began to pay greater heed to Algerian requests for equipment and aid.132
In addition the US asked for military basing rights in Algeria, but this request has not yet
been granted, or at least not publically.133 In 2006, at a speech given in Algiers, US
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld emphasized that under the framework of the
GWOT, Algeria has a valuable role to play in the US counterterrorist agenda, but made
no mention of liberalization and democratization.134  The US could do more to pressure
the ruling establishment in Algeria, and in Morocco, to make meaningful elections fair
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and open, to cultivate the parliamentary bodies to represent citizens (and not just rubber-
stamp the whims of the ruling elite), to grant freedom of speech, and to clean up the
criminal systems in both countries that have wrongly imprisoned or disappeared its
dissident citizens.
President Bouteflika continues to call for domestic reconciliation in the wake of the
vicious civil war, pleading also with the US for debt relief and increased attention to the
root causes of terrorism, such as “poverty and inequality.”135  As long as the military
leadership continues to manipulate the country, however, the requests of the president are
not the final word on Algerian foreign relations.  The military demands a different
approach, the military and the security establishment in Algeria call for the eradication of
terrorism in a more heavy-handed crackdown on politicized Mosques religious schools,
and religiously-based political parties.136  The fissures in foreign and domestic policy
within the upper levels of Algerian leadership make it difficult for diplomatic partners
like the US to construct foreign relations.  What is certain is that neither governing
faction can be counted on to represent the best interest of Algerians.
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Chapter 2: The Terrorist Threat
Background
Defining terrorism can be done on broad terms, for instance by addressing the
asymmetric nature of terrorist warfare, the indiscriminant targeting of civilians, and other
characteristics, but no single theory can cover its complexity.137  Political Scientist Mhand
Berkouk138 calls it a “ubiquitous occurrence that transcends cultural, religious, economic
and political contexts.”  Historians agree the term initially referred to state-sponsored
terror, having roots in the period known as the reign of terror that followed the French
Revolution.139  Berkouk argues the importance of making a distinction between terrorism
– a recourse that can never be justified morally or politically – and resistance, a right
guaranteed by international law.140  Political scientist John P. Entelis astutely argues that
in the case of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, terrorism is “the most extreme
manifestation” of the discontent caused when sub-state militant forces intersect with
high-tension sociopolitical fault lines.141  That intersection is the focus of this chapter.
The background section outlines the variables specific to North Africa that will help
explain the roots of terrorism in the focus countries, Morocco and Algeria.  The second
and third parts will give a material analysis of the terrorist threat posed to the region and
to American interests, focusing on two major groups with ties to al-Qaeda: the Salafist
Group for Teaching and Combat (GSPC) in Algeria, and the Moroccan Islamic
Combatant Group (GICM).
The legacy of French colonial rule has had influenced the dynamics of terrorism in North
Africa, but in a different way for each country.  Although under the same imperial force,
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Morocco and Algeria did not share the same colonial experience, starting with the pre-
colonial era.142  Recognizing their strategic location at the mouth of the Mediterranean
Sea, the Moroccan sultans of the Alawi dynasty (1664-present) wove a web of bilateral
trade agreements throughout the nineteenth century with European nations as well as with
the United States.143 Popular movements among the people of Morocco at the time
opposed what they perceived as a partnering with ‘the infidel’ that contradicted the
foundations of the sharif’s God-ordained legitimacy.144  Morocco remained largely
independent until 1904 when France and Spain went against previous treaties, claiming
Morocco for the French, and what was then called the Spanish Sahara for Spain.  The
first Moroccan nationalists took to peaceful disobedience in protest of the French
colonists during the inter-war period.  In 1955 the Alawi sultan returned from his two-
year French-imposed exile and he declared Morocco a constitutional monarchy.  France
was never as invested in Morocco as it was in Algeria; it granted Morocco independence
by 1956 in an extraordinarily peaceful decolonization process.145
In 1830, France invaded Algeria under the pretense that the dey (or chief janissary) of
Algiers had insulted the honor of a French diplomat while demanding the repayment of
seven to eight million Francs Algeria had leant to support the Napoleonic wars.146  France
dethroned the dey and over time replaced the Ottomanized regional governors with
French-trained Algerian elites – a class that grew into the liberal professional class
eventually known as the évolués.147  During the initial invasion, the French army
brutalized the countryside with its scorched-earth policy, wiping out resistance and
staking claims for France’s new district across the Mediterranean.  That was the vision of
the French, not only to reap harvests and resources from an African territory, but also to
extend their state’s physical border southward.  By the 1950s French settlers comprised
ten percent of Algeria’s population and they had representation in Paris proportionate to
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other districts.  The Algerians who made up the other ninety percent of the population
were not given citizenship and were excluded completely from political or economic
participation and brutally oppressed.148
Lasting from 1830 until 1962, the French settler colony was a violently invasive
debasement of the Algerian people’s culture and societal cohesion.  Frantz Fanon, the
psychologist from Martinique, was an influential anti-colonial writer at the time, and
many say he was the ideological leader of Algeria’s independence movement.  His 1961
book Les Damnés de la Terre (The Wretched of the Earth) argued not just for the
justification for but the necessity of violence to remove an oppressor that recognizes no
other system.149  Distorted remnants of that ethos can be identified in the violent civil war
during which the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) attacked scores of government workers,
foreigners and civilians.150  In 1954, the nationalist forces, the Front du Libération
Nationale (FLN) began a bloody eight-year battle for independence that would not just
pit Algerians against the French; in their efforts to completely extract French influence
from their country, the FLN would also attack Algerian civilians believed to be
cooperating with or merely sympathetic to the French.  Algeria won independence in
1962 and the country faced a strongly divided flock of FLN generals scrambling to seize
the reigns of the fledgling country in the wake of French rule.
This brief overview of the colonial experience in Algeria and Morocco has provided
historical depth to two currents – social discontent and the legacy of militancy – the
intersection of which partly explains North African terrorist activity, according to
Entelis.151  For a study on how the experience of post-colonial nation building was also a
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defining era, see Hakimaian and Moschaver’s 2001 book The State and Global Change:
The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa.152
Skipping ahead to the twenty-first century, Algeria is still a nation where power resides in
the hands of the unaccountable few governing over the unrepresented many.153  The FLN,
the ruling party and the movement that battled France for Algeria’s independence, draws
the greatest animosity from its radical Islamic militants for its secular authoritarianism.
The ruling elite and the military apparatus are one and the same, thoroughly dominated
by a single party.   Morocco’s monarchy still manipulates its influence in Madrid and
Paris, as well as London and Washington, to its economic and political advantage.  King
Mohammed VI, son of Hassan II, took the throne in 1999 and was seen initially as a
reformer.  He has been lauded for his support for the 2004 family code, which was
notable for granting more rights to women under the state constitution.  However the
gestures are largely symbolic and empty, and human rights abuses on the part of the state
are commonplace.  Washington had high hopes for the young monarch to become a more
liberal democratic ruler, but his reign so far has shown greater movement in the opposite
direction, towards heavy-handed government supervision and oppression.154
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Terrorism in Algeria: The GSPC and Al-Qaeda
Al-Qaeda is a different organization at present than it was in 2001.  Recent trends in its
organization include an expansion, through the internet and other means, of its jihadist
message-generating machine, or what analysts have called the ‘Global Islamic Media
Front.’155 Al-Qaeda’s recent emphasis on propaganda campaigns has by no means
eclipsed the primacy of its militant campaigns.  The increased emphasis, however, has
initiated a trend in which many smaller groups are beginning to join al-Qaeda
symbolically in attempts to bolster their credibility.  When the Salafist Group for
Teaching and Combat (Groupe salafiste pour la prédecation et le combat, GSPC) took up
the name of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007, it was unclear if this
pledge had operational significance or not.156  At the least, the new allegiance is
representative of this same broad trend in jihadist groups, however it was no simple
opportunism that led to the decision; instead, the alignment resulted from a cooperative
effort between three groups: Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the GSPC, and al-Qaeda itself.157  This
section will first look at the founding and evolution of the GSPC and how its ties to al-
Qaeda were established, followed by a discussion of its relevance to regional security and
the American assessment of the extremist threat emanating from Algeria.
The attacks in Afghanistan and the worldwide hunt for al-Qaeda operatives scrambled
their usual communication networks and organizational abilities.  By the end of 2003 al-
Qaeda’s strength had all but evaporated in the wake of the American response.  In North
Africa, radical Islamist terrorism had begun to decline.158  In Algeria, for instance, the
radical Islamic opposition groups were suffering from internal fights and key members
had started to cave in to government calls for a national reconciliation.159  At that point in
time the US launched the war in Iraq, and over the course of the following four years, the
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militant group known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq came to provide a globalized template for other
Islamic militant groups operating on the local-scale.
Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad, or Unity and Jihad, is the name of the small group commanded
by Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq that would eventually come to be known as Al-Qaeda
in Iraq.  Their efforts to become part of Osama Bin Laden’s global al-Qaeda network
demonstrate the trend some refer to as al-Qaeda’s renaissance,160 others as simply a new
trend in al-Qaeda terrorist tactics.161  By either description, the Unity and Jihad group was
able to attract the attention of al-Qaeda’s leaders with the execution of several bloody and
daring military operations against the coalition forces in Iraq.162  Adopting Bin Laden’s
tactic of filming these attacks in order to provide shock value that the world media can
relay, the Iraqi group became perhaps best known for the kidnapping and beheading of a
number of foreign civilians working on the side of the coalition forces in 2004.163  Next,
Zarqawi released a public statement of allegiance to Osama bin Laden at the end of that
same year.  This move, consisting of a highly publicized declaration of allegiance to al-
Qaeda, coupled with the release of videos showing attacks and messages of recruitment,
became an easily copied strategy for jihadist groups elsewhere.164  Thus, al-Qaeda began
to operate in something like a franchise model, and the GSPC in Algeria was the next
group to take up the process.
The GSPC was not passively caught up in the jihadist fervor after 9/11 and co-opted by
al-Qaeda; militant Islamism in Algeria goes deeper than that.  In order to understand how
the group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) came to be, a longer chronology is
needed.  Algeria’s experience of decolonization and its long bloody battle with the
French for independence gave way in the seventies and eighties to a strong-armed,
secular military autocracy.  Social dissent was classified as harmful to the young state’s
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stability and was smothered or bought off in the name of national progress.165 The state
elites gained confidence in their ruling mandate through their ability to suppress
dissenters.  Civil frustration with the ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN),
had by the mid-1980s metastasized into a welling of civil unrest and increased grass-roots
organization.  The opposition leaders rallied people against the ruling elites using Islamic
symbols, congregating often in Mosques to hold political meetings.  Unemployment
among young men in particular, a general lack of public services and widespread poverty
were three main factors feeding into mounting civil unrest.  Despite an oil boom in 1985,
by the end of the decade state export revenues had fallen by more than 40 per cent in less
than four years,166 and the national budget could not support the level of state subsidies
that had previously been used to mute aggression towards the government.167
In October 1988, riots broke out in multiple Algerian cities.  Within days, what began
with a frustrated group of ransacking high school students on strike in Algiers became a
nation-wide series of popular demonstrations organized by Islamic fundamentalist
leaders. The demonstrations took the form of destructive marches through the center of
major towns, targeting local law enforcement buildings, political councils, luxury hotels,
and state-owned businesses.168  Government workers and police were also targets of
humiliation and violence.  The military responded with brutality, tear gas, and firepower,
and by the fifth day five hundred youths, mostly boys and men, had been killed.169 To put
a halt to the violence and destruction, president Chadli Benjedid made a speech that,
although vague in its language, signified for the first time a willingness on the part of the
FLN to “eliminate the current monopoly of responsibility.”170  Although skeptical, the
nation prepared for the first multiparty elections in its history.
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The most viable opposition represented by the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique
du Salut, FIS), founded on the wave of momentum generated by the October riots.  Then,
in the June 1990 local elections, FIS won fifty-five per cent of the vote nationwide and
even seasoned political observers were surprised and impressed at the success of the
country’s first significant opposition party.171  The FIS candidates’ landside defeat in
most of the contests for regional councils surprised most political observers.  More
surprising still was the ability of FIS officials to subsequently run the local public
services at a more cost-effective rate.172  The new atmosphere of democracy spurred an
increase in civil demonstrations among a population that could sense a loosening of
restrictions.  Unfortunately, by 1991 the disorder caused by the protests gave the military
elites the excuse they had been looking for to once again clamp down on dissidents.  The
declaration of a three-month state of emergency in 1991, and the military regime’s
banning of the FIS in 1992 marked the beginning of a civil war between an abusive and
repressive state military and the militant Islamic groups that rose up in the place of FIS.173
One such Islamic group is the Armed Islamic Group  (Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA)
which established itself quickly as the most radical and most violent of all FIS splinter
groups.  The cells operating under the GIA banner are characterized by a refusal to
entertain negotiations with the military government, an indiscriminate targeting of
civilians, and a violent ferocity in their tactics.174 Guidère explains that the GIA is merely
one denomination of groups that splintered off of the Islamist movement in the 1990s.175
The GIA was notoriously violent and indiscriminate with their targets, with a strategy
based on escalating human costs in the battle.176  In September 1998, the splinter group
called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) led by Hassan Hattab
became one two main groups that had distanced themselves from the GIA’s
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counterproductive, murderous conduct and failed leadership.177 With their arsenals
depleted after nearly a decade of civil war, GSPC activists agreed to supply Osama bin
Laden with trained soldiers in exchange for money and weapons.178  The GSPC decided
to continue the struggle against the Algerian regime until it became more “Islamicized,”
and they made the government security establishment their sole target.179
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Al-Qaeda in Morocco
In his book Al Qaïda à la conquête du Maghreb, Islamic studies expert Mathieu Guidère
analyzes the al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist networks in Algeria, Morocco, Libya and
Tunisia.  His chapter for Morocco is entitled “La pépinière d’Al-Qaïda” or “the breeding
ground of al-Qaeda.”180  In Morocco, the relative intensity of dedication to the idea of
militant Islam is at least partially attributable to the monarchy’s longtime efforts to
appear as a moderate Islamic regime.181  This political posturing has been advantageous
when the government wanted to draw closer to western countries.  Certain religious
elements in society – and not just the militant Islamic groups – consider this policy out of
touch with the monarch’s traditional title of title of Amir al-Mu'minin, or Commander of
the Faithful.   As is true in Algeria and other parts of the Maghreb, the state security
apparatus has contained, coerced or disbanded a host of the most virulent civil society
organizations to the point where fundamentalist Islamic groups, and their extremist
militant arms, are the only examples left of functioning outlets for dissent.182
The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) was formed initially by soldiers (or
Moudjahidines) trained in Afghanistan.  The main enemy of the GICM is the Moroccan
monarchy, who they aim to destabilize and replace with an Islamic state.  Like the GSPC
in Algeria, the GICM regards the government as illegitimate, so when the US is seen to
support this government they become targets of aggression by virtue of association.  As
the Polisario continued its dispute against the monarchy, al-Qaeda approached the
militant factions within the Sahrawi nationalist groups to solicit their help in the ultimate
goal of destabilizing the government. 183   According to Moroccan security sources, in
2006 a member of al-Qaeda close to Ayman Al Zawahiri, bin Laden’s second in
command, was sent to Morocco on a mission to organize a strategy to destabilize the
                                                 
180 Mathieu Guidère, Al Qaïda à la conquête du Maghreb: le terrorisme aux portes de l’Europe. Monaco :
Éditions du Rocher (2007) 185
181 John P. Entelis, “The Democratic Imperative vs. the Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State between
Transition and Terrorism.” Strategic Insights, 30:6 (June 2005). 10.
182 Robert G. Berschinski, “AFRICOM’S Dilemma: The ‘Global War on Terrorism,’ ‘Capacity Building,’
Humanitarianism, and the Future of US Security Policy in Africa.” Strategic Studies Institute of the US
Army War College (2007) 17
183 Guidère (2007) 194.
Mayock
48
monarchy.184  This envoy to Morocco was to work under the direction of the GICM.185
This demonstrates how the al-Qaeda network grows itself to better reach the distant
enemy, while the smaller groups that fall under its umbrella are still mainly concerned
with local issues and local enemies.186
On March 11, 2007, three years to the day after the Moroccan-organized Madrid attacks,
two youths attempted to carry out an attack on an internet café in Casablanca, but only
one of the suicide bombers detonated his explosives.  The young men had come to a café,
armed with explosives, to confirm their instructions over the Internet through a jihadist
chatroom.  Access to these sites had been blocked in a 2003 measure by the government
to limit the possibility of communication among terrorists.  The shop-keeper called the
police when the boys grew frustrated at what they thought was a glitch in the computers,
at which point one detonated his explosives, and the other, badly injured tried to run but
was caught by the police.  This vignette shows that Islamic terrorists in Morocco are not
necessarily the Moudjahidines trained in Afghanistan, but could be average, unemployed,
disenfranchised youth – and this is just the tip of the network’s iceberg.   Although not
the most significant attack in recent years, it is one of the most recent and indicates the
far-reaching ability of al-Qaeda’s ‘Global Islamic Media Front’ to stoke the flames of
localized discontent with a perceived connection to a global jihadist movement.  Guidère
writes that the AQIM has strengthened its networking, publicized its message, and should
be taken as a serious threat to Maghrebi countries.187
Moroccan Moudjahidines have also demonstrated their ability to carry out attacks in
Europe, such as the high-profile 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed 191 people;
these individuals are now united – at least in title – under the AQIM.  The intent to
perpetrate violent attacks on government targets in Morocco and Algeria is clear, as is the
ability to operate in European countries through Maghrebi networks.  Any US policy
framework must acknowledge this physical threat.  The QWOT recognizes this threat, but
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its weakness is that it does not address the motives and makeup of individual groups such
as the GSPC and the GICM.  If US military strategists paid greater attention to the real
enemy of these groups, they would often find it to be the Moroccan monarchy, or the
Algerian military establishment – the very governments that the US under the Bush
administration has worked so hard to support.188  The following chapter will discuss this
and other oversights that have undermined the effectiveness of US counterterrorist
activities in Morocco and Algeria under the GWOT and programs like the TSCTP.
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Chapter 3: The GWOT in North Africa
Background
Buzan argues that events of 9/11 changed the perception of global threats more than they
changed the actual global security environment.189  One outcome was a reassessment on
the part of the US government of the intensity and the source of terrorist threats.  As a
result of this policy reassessment through the lens of the GWOT, certain characteristics of
Morocco and Algeria contributed to these countries being categorized as likely “breeding
grounds for terrorists.”190 These attributes led the Bush administration to classify the area
as a region of concern for US national security: the extreme poverty of the majority of its
people, its Muslim heritage, its overall lack of democratic freedoms, its large swaths of
under governed desert territory,191 and its geographical proximity to Iraq – which in 2003
became the main theater of action in the GWOT .
Two factors of this classification have been discussed previously in chapter two: first,
that this approach is based on a misperception of Algerian and Moroccan people and their
relationship to Islam;192 and second, that terrorism has a more complex origin in North
Africa.  This broad characterization is representative of a particular method of threat
assessment in Washington, which the US State Department’s Chief Strategist in the
Office for the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, David Kilcullen, calls ‘aggregation.’193
Aggregation refers to the tendency to group local insurgencies or Islamic radicals into
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one homogenous, artificially monolithic threat.194  This tactic pervades GWOT
policymaking broadly, not just in the Maghreb.195 In a situation in which security is
assessed through aggregation, it becomes common for worst-case scenarios to win
attention over realistic threat assessments.196  This process exaggerates the threat posed
by individual groups such as the low-level al-Qaeda affiliates in the Maghreb, despite
their essential dissimilarity.197
So far this paper has elaborated on the general nature of the GWOT in the definitions
section and in the introduction.  In addition, chapters one and two describe the
contemporary social political environment in Morocco and Algeria and its history.  Not
long after the introduction of the GWOT as the major framework for American foreign
policy-making, Washington made a decision to step up its presence in Morocco and
Algeria.  This presence involved building partnerships in counterterrorism,198 helping
train and equip the countries’ militaries, and planning to one day establish a large forward
operating base in one of these two North African allies in order to ‘keep an eye on’ the
terrorists operating out of this region.199  The following sections will first look at the
thinking behind the US approach to counterterrorism in Morocco and Algeria, then
elaborate on the the current US operations in action and their goals.
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The Banana Theory: the thinking behind US Involvement in the Maghreb
Scholars and critics disagree widely on the impact of the GWOT as a security framework
on Algeria and Morocco, but all sides agree that North Africa did not constitute a region
of high priority for the US until 2003.200  With US military pressure on the Taliban in
Afghanistan mounting, and the invasion of Iraq imminent, the US military began in early
2003 to theorize where the ‘enemy’ (Islamic terrorists) would move next.  A concept
called the ‘banana theory’ began to develop, named for the banana-shaped path on which
military leaders believed terrorists would travel from Afghanistan, over the Horn of
Africa, through the largely un-patrolled Sahara Desert and then north to militant
epicenters in Morocco and Algeria.201  In a statement made to the military newspaper
Stars and Stripes, EUROCOM Major General Jeff Kohler explained that because the
governments of Sudan, Libya, Chad, Niger, Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Morocco have
trouble policing their vast interiors, terrorists would find havens in the lawless regions
around the Maghreb’s porous southern borders, providing an “easy back door into Europe
through Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.”202 This statement reveals the predominant
mindset in Washington at the time.  In February that year, when the GSPC claimed
responsibility for the capture of thirty-one European hostages, the ‘Banana Theory’
gained credibility, and the Bush administration started to pay greater attention to
terrorism in North Africa.203
The disputed nature of the kidnapping of these thirty-two hostages is a point of
contention between authors writing on US involvement in the Maghreb; some authors –
from social anthropologists to economists – argue that the kidnapping was fabricated to
attract and justify US military assistance.  Reports from American military listening posts
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in the Sahel and officials in the Algerian security establishment indicate that a faction of
the GSPC kidnapped over thirty European tourists in the Sahara and held them hostage in
the mountainous region to the south.204  The faction was led by Ammari Saifi, known as
“El Para” for his stint as a paratrooper in the Algerian army.205  They split the hostages
into two groups, transported them through the desert, and after three months all were
freed when the German government reportedly paid five million euros for their return.206
The US military subsequently supported the Algerian army in their pursuit of El Para,
which led forces across Algeria, Mali, Niger, and finally Chad, where he was captured by
Chadian rebels and returned to Algiers for trail in 2004.207 Mustafa Barth provides
compelling evidence, however, that this long evasion led by El Para was in fact reliant on
provisions supplied by the Algerian military over the course of the pursuit, even after the
hostages had been released.208
In the aftermath of the kidnapping and the March 2004 capture of the purported leader of
the kidnappers, the Pan-Sahel Initiative was soon upgraded and renamed the Trans-
Saharan Counter-terrorism Initiative (TSCTI).  More countries including Morocco were
included in the targeted group.  The goal remained to bolster the resilience of Sahelian
militaries and engage in preventative measures to thwart terrorists in the Sahel.
American forces in North Africa have utilized both diplomatic measures as well as
kinetic (lethal) counter-terrorism operations in their mission to disrupt terrorist activities
and prevent attacks.209  The 2003 kidnapping and yearlong hunt for El Para were cited in
Washington as an example of the porousness of the Sahelian boarders, the inefficiency of
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state militaries in the region, and the need for greater US surveillance and influence.210
Scholars and journalists are left asking: Was the US justified in taking up operations in
the Sahara, and did Algeria intentionally inflate the threat to attract US attention?
Political scientist Robert Berschinski points out that despite Washington’s exaggerated
reaction to the threat posed by the GSPC thereafter, the event seemed to “reinforce PSI’s
core philosophical underpinnings: A transnational terrorist group had used the Sahel’s
ungoverned areas to attack Western interests and evade authorities.”211 The International
Crisis Group produced an analysis of the Sahelian region and its ungoverned spaces in
2005.  It points out that regardless of the fact that PSI assistance helped enable Sahelian
militaries to track a terrorist group through four countries, the goal to fully patrol the
desert borders of these countries could not be attained even by ten times as many trained
troops.212
According to several authors publishing in 2005-2008, the 2003 kidnapping incident in
Algeria played a serious role in justifying the US involvement in North Africa.213  The US
military supported the Algerian and Chadian armies in their pursuit of the terrorist group
across multiple desert borders.  PSI-trained troops engaged in a firefight that killed forty-
three members of the group before El Para was captured, brought to Libya then extradited
to Algeria for trial.  Berschinski, a former US Air Force intelligence officer and veteran
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, writes that the ordeal demonstrates the success of the
training of the military training provided under the PSI.   What it does not necessarily
demonstrate is the long-term usefulness of bursts of kinetic operations such as this:
“Though often tactically successful, these efforts – against Algerian insurgents in North
Africa […] have neither benefited larger American security interests nor stabilized events
in their respective regions.”214  The study from which this quotation is taken was
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supervised at the US Army War College and still, despite the use of military euphemism,
it is a strong statement of criticism.
Evans and Philips provide detailed accounts of how al-Qaeda grew its networks in the
Sahel region, starting in the 1990s even before counter-terrorism took on such
preeminence on the international stage after 9/11.  Their analysis supports the threat
perceived by Pentagon officials, however also suggests that Algeria had reason to inflate
their reports of terrorist activity in order to receive military assistance from the US.215
Taking this argument even further, Authors Keenan and Barth argue that key elements of
the reports issued by Algeria and by the US were fraudulent, or even that one or both had
complicity in the kidnapping for political motivations.216  The scholarly community is
divided in this subject, and some arguments read more like conspiracy theories than
analyses.
Barth and Keenan offer the most credible evidence to suggest that there was a
government cover-up of the Algerian military’s role in the affair.  Barth points out that at
the time of the kidnapping, the Algerian military government establishment was offering
to the US its expertise in counter-terrorism in exchange for weapons deals from the US.217
This expertise, they claimed, was gained over the decade-long civil war against Islamic
rebel groups, stemming from the military’s nullification of 1991 election results in the
Islamic Salvation Front’s favor.  Keenan argues that El Para’s “modus operandi” was
inconsistent with both the trend of decreased violence in Algeria overall, as well as with
the known activities of the known terrorist groups in operation at the time.218
Additionally, the Sahelian region was politically, socially and geographically unsuited to
the kind of over-ground terrorism El Para’s group undertook.219
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As Barth and Keenan’s argument goes, both countries got what they wanted by
exaggerating key aspects of the event: the US got their excuse to establish a military
presence in North Africa in response to a tangible threat, and Algeria received more
military backing and weapons deals in return for their cooperation in the GWOT.220  Like
other countries in the Sahelian region, they stand to gain financially or politically by
playing on US fear of an Islamist terrorist threat.221  Another group that benefited from
the assumptions of the banana theory, and from US actions undertaken in response to the
2003 kidnapping, is the GSPC.  Washington’s misunderstanding of the GSPC and their
grievances elevated the cause of this local insurgency to the level of an international
jihad.  This exaggeration helped them obtain the notoriety necessary to secure al-Qaeda’s
backing in what this paper has called the franchise model of al-Qaeda.222
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 US operations in the Maghreb and AFRICOM
Washington is committed to multiple military operations or diplomatic initiatives that
have bearing over US relations with Morocco and Algeria.  For example, the US is
beholden to the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, developed by the Group
of Eight Industrialized Nations (G8) countries in 2004. It is a vague agreement to uphold
democracy, human dignity, rule of law, economic opportunity, and freedom in countries
spanning Afghanistan to Israel, Saudi Arabia to Mali.223  This agreement, proposed by the
Bush administration, has had scant participation among the Arab countries to which it
pertains, and has relatively little impact due to lack of funding and little enthusiasm
among the G8.  The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) 224 is an
initiative coordinate by the US State Department that incorporates foreign military
training and diplomatic cooperation in counterterrorism.  The TSCTP grew out of the
2002 Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), which also had the central goal of “preventative
involvement in potential terrorist safe-havens.”225  TSCTP took over the PSI operations in
2005 when it launched a major joint military operation in the Maghreb called Flintlock
2005, a training mission to enhance tactical operations, land navigations and intelligence
gathering in Algeria, Senegal, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad.226  Military
operations are coordinated under the project entitled Operation Enduring Freedom –
Trans Sahara (OEF-TS).
The TSCTP is a multi-agency program under the supervision of the State Department that
provides training and equipment to Algeria and Morocco, as well as nine of its Maghrebi
neighbors.227  Writing for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Emily Hunt
writes that the TSCTP has as its goal the tactical military training to bolster the militaries
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of what Washington strategists have labeled “important” African countries.228  This refers
to the strategic concept of ‘pivotal states,’ developed in the 1990s to illustrate the
regional importance of certain handpicked American allies.  These are countries whose
stability upholds the political and economic order and political system, but whose
collapse would drastically disrupt a region.229  Both Morocco and Algeria have taken
turns on this list of important African countries in terms of American foreign policy
priorities.
The different administrative agencies that comprise the leadership of the TSCTP are
indicative of its various purposes.230  Foremost is the State Department in providing the
strategic and tactical coordination for the program.  The State Department’s involvement
highlights the diplomatic goal of building up the counterterrorism programs of the
TSCTP’s nine participant countries within American parameters.  The Department of
Defense (DoD) is charged with organizing the joint military operations and military
training of Saharan militaries alongside the US Special Forces operating out of the US
Europe Command Center, or EUROCOM.  In 2007 it was announced that AFRICOM,
the fifth and newest command center, would take over African operations for
EUROCOM by the end of 2008, inheriting responsibility for the TSCTP.  Finally, the US
Agency for International Development (USAID) is the newest and smallest component of
the TSCTP, or the ‘partnership’, as the TSCTP is sometimes called.  USAID looks to
incorporate humanitarian projects into the partnership’s objectives.  The policy of giving
aid according to compliance with the GWOT security rational is controversial among
other European aid agencies that do not take security and foreign policy concerns into aid
distribution.231
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AFRICOM is one of five US operation command centers, and the first to directly address
Africa and its problems with terrorism.232  Berschinski criticizes the post-9/11 model of
US military operations that AFRICOM seeks to perpetuate, writing that the combination
of what military analysts call ‘kinetic’ and ‘non-kinetic’ operations, or in other words
armed combat missions and humanitarian or community-building operations, is a
counter-productive strategy.233  While the emphasis for AFRICOM’s mode of operation
in the Maghreb is on humanitarian projects and training local militaries in
counterterrorism tactics, the application of kinetic operations against al-Qaeda operatives
is frequent enough to draw contradictions between the stated objectives of the TSCTP
and its actions.  The aggressiveness of America’s presence in the cities and rural areas of
Morocco and Algeria is cultivating an already pernicious anti-Americanism.  The United
States’ strong-armed diplomacy and offensive military tactics are counterproductive
means of attaining the twin goals of counterterrorism and democratization.  In practice,
US military intervention in Morocco and Algeria treat only the symptoms of terrorist
activity while actually compounding the root causes.234
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Conclusion
The impact of the Global War on Terror on Morocco and Algeria is a broad topic that
begs further investigation.  Multiple sections of society, culture, politics and economics
are involved in assessing all the ways one superpower’s foreign policy initiative can
impact these two countries’ security at the individual, state and international level.  As
time goes on there will be greater insight into the successes, the faults, and the long-term
effects of this turn in policy dubbed the GWOT.
In Morocco and Algeria, the rapidly growing current of economic and social discontent
can produce an environment conducive to radical Islamist terrorism when crossed with
the legacy of militancy in sub-state groups.235  The GWOT securitization has created
superficial cooperation between Washington and the authoritarian governments of
Morocco and Algeria, rather than targeting the underlying socio-economic problems.
The GWOT promotes competition between these neighboring countries to prove that
their struggle with radical Islamist terrorism is more deserving of US aid and military
assistance.  Washington’s goal to encourage democratization is undermined by its support
for authoritarian government establishments who lack transparency.  US involvement in
Morocco and Algeria under the GWOT framework is incompatible with security interests
of the region.  The inclusion in the TSCTP of humanitarian projects, distributing funding
along the parameters of a predetermined American counterterrorist agenda, is ineffective
in dealing with militarized groups with localized grievances.
This paper has shown that US counterterrorism tactics in the Maghreb have been
ineffective, but that argument does not imply a disregard for the seriousness of the
terrorist threat emanating from Morocco and Algeria.  The threat is real, it demands
action, but Washington has fundamentally misunderstood its nuanced origins.  The effect
of al-Qaeda’s global Islamic media front has been to increase access to radical Islamic
messages encouraging violence among Morocco and Algeria’s under-represented and
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unemployed youth.  Islamist extremism has a small but receptive audience for the first
time in generations.  John Entelis identifies a growing cadre of disenfranchised youths
living at home and abroad who are growing frustrated with the oppression and corruption
of the Moroccan monarchy and of the Algerian military state.  He argues that as long as
the US is “perceived [by the Maghrebi people] as deeply implicated in the maintenance
of this ‘unjust’ system… they will be the natural targets for terrorists and terrorism.”236
The overall security interests of the US, and of Morocco and Algeria are poorly served by
these shortsighted terms of cooperation.
Washington continues to ignore the Moroccan monarchy’s disregard for international law
in the Western Sahara dispute, as well as the Algerian military establishment’s role in the
violent civil war in the 1990s.  This deliberate inaction contradicts the stated concern for
humanitarian goals such as the primacy of the rule of law and the need for
democratization.  The recent strengthening of American ties with Morocco and Algeria
under the GWOT mandate has fortified the authoritarian security establishment of both
countries.  Overall, there has been real improvement in counterterrorism capabilities in
militaries trained by the TSCTP.  To the Moroccan and Algerian people’s detriment, their
governments have used the GWOT securitization to introduce increasingly harsh
legislation and military power to suppress legitimate political opposition groups.
Washington’s attempt to develop civil society and human rights in both countries through
the TSCTP’s humanitarian and military components is producing the opposite effect, and
democratic opening in Morocco and Algeria appears on hold for the foreseeable future.237
This paper began with an outline of a three-part argument: (1) The long-term security of
Morocco and Algeria depends upon their cooperation towards democratization,
liberalization and counterterrorism.  Cooperation has been limited by the resilience of the
Western Saharan dispute, compounded by Washington’s fear of destabilizing the
Moroccan monarchy, which they perceive to be a moderate ally in the Arab world. (2)
The US involvement injects enough military strength and international political clout into
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each government to sustain their domestic oppression of civil demands for
democratization.  In fact their oppression of dissident voices in the civil society is more
easily justified by the GWOT as a securitization framework.  (3) The sustained build-up
of US forces in the region, originally intended to eradicate al-Qaeda strongholds, has
instead promoted stronger anti-American aggression leaving the disenfranchised more
receptive to al-Qaeda’s message of global jihad.238  The achievement of stated GWOT
goals in Morocco and Algeria such as democratization and liberalization is undermined
by the actions taken to promote them.  The application of the GWOT priorities has
negatively impacted the security of Moroccan and Algerian citizens, who today face
stricter oppression from their authoritarian governments.  If security is measured by the
robustness of these two authoritarian security establishments then the overall impact has
been positive, but by shoring up the legitimacy of increasingly unpopular and
undemocratic governments, the GWOT framework has harmed America’s long-term
strategic security interests in Morocco and Algeria.
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Appendix 1
Map: The Maghreb
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